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Per Se Legality In Copyright Licensing
by LAWRENCE J. SISKIND*
I
Introduction
Antitrust law' abhors monopolies. Copyright law2 sanctions
them. Conflict and uncertainty are inevitable.
The Rule of Reason--the traditional expedient of antitrust
law for resolving ambiguity-only adds to the confusion. It
considers benign and anticompetitive effects of arrangements
on a case by case basis.4 This may provide fairness for arrange-
ments already in place, but it does not provide guidance for ar-
rangements that are contemplated.
Antitrust law addresses this need for certainty by classifying
specific actions as illegal per se.5 The doctrine guides by declar-
ing what is prohibited. Businessmen and copyright holders,
* BA., Harvard College, 1974; JD., Harvard Law School, 1978. The author is a
partner with the law firm of Cooper, White & Cooper in San Francisco, California.
1. See generally the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1-2 (1982); the Clayton
Act, 15 US.C. §j 13-18, 26 (1982); and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§45 (1982). The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits any unreasonable interference, by
contract, combination, or conspiracy, with the ordinary, usual, and freely competitive
pricing or distribution system of the open market in interstate trade. The Clayton Act
was enacted in 1914 as an amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act and deals with
antitrust regulations and unfair trade practices. The Clayton Act prohibits price dis-
crimination, tying and exclusive dealing contracts, mergers, and interlocking director-
ates where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce. The Federal Trade Commission Act, also enacted
in 1914, created the Federal Trade Commission. The Commission's principal funo-
tions are to promote free and fair competition in interstate commerce through pre-
vention of general trade restraints such as price-fixing agreements, false advertising,
boycotts, illegal combinations of competitors and other unfair methods of competition.
See Ill F. KzWRr & J. BAUER, FEDERAL ANTrRMus LAW 4-9 (1983).
2. 17 US.C. §§ 101-914 (West Supp. 1985).
3. Under the "Rule of Reason," the legality of restraints on trade is determined
by weighing all the factors of the case such as the history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy and the purpose or
end sought to be attained. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231. 238
(191); see Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 433 U.S 36, 47-59 (1977).
4. Comfnentai TV, 433 US. at 47-59.
& See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
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however, deserve positive guidance, as well. They deserve to
know what is allowed. They deserve the guidance of a new doc-
trine of per se legality.
This article contends that the 1976 Copyright ActP has vested
the copyright holder with complete discretion to set the geo-
graphical boundaries of his exclusive territorial licenses. The
shadowy strictures of the Rule of Reason do not apply. This
contention emerges from three bases: (1) the 1976 Copyright
Act and its legislative history; (2) the body of analogous prece-
dent in patent law; and (3) a conceptual analysis of copyright
This article also analyzes the holding and reasoning in United
States v. Chicago Tribune-New York News Syndicate, Inc.,1 the
only reported decision directly contradicting this article's the-
sis. The article concludes that exclusive territorial licenses
under copyright should be treated as legal per se.
II
The Copyright Statute
The Constitution bestows on Congress the power to grant
legal monopolies to copyright holders. It allows Congress "to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."" Congress has
exercised this power by enacting a series of copyright statutes.9
The most recent enactment, the 1976 Copyright Act,10 provides
one basis for the thesis of this article. For the first time, the
copyright statute explicitly authorizes copyright holders to
grant exclusive licenses, geographically limited at the holder's
discretion."
6. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-914 (West Supp. 1985).
7. 309 F. Supp. 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9. Congress enacted the nation's first copyright statute at its first session. Act of
May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124. Since then, Congress has revised its copyright legislation on
several occasions. The most significant revisions were made in 1802 (Act of April 29,
1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171), 1831 (Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436), 1870 (Act of July
8, 1870, oh. 230, 16 Stat. 198), and 1909 (Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 36, 35 Stat. 1075).
The 1909 Act, with amendments, remained the law until January 1, 1978, the effective
date of the 1976 Copyright Act.
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101406 (1982).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d):
Transfer of Ownership .... (2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section
106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The
[Vol. 7
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A. The 1976 Copyright Act
Even before passage of the 1976 Act, case law recognized the
copyright holder's right to grant exclusive licenses. The 1976
Act, however, marks the first statutory recognition of this prin-
ciple. The Act provides that the exclusive rights constituting
the copyright monopoly' s include the right to distribute copies
or phonorecords of the copyrighted work "to the public by sale
or other fr nfer of ownership."'4 Transfer of ownership is de-
fined as "an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any
other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright
or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright."'5
The Act makes other references to the validity of exclusive
licenses, as well. For example, the Act delimits the rights of
cable systems to make secondary transmissions by providing
that "[t]his subsection shall not be construed to supersede the
exclusivity protection provision of any existing agreement, or
any such agreement hereafter entered into, between a cable
system and a television broadcast station.., or a network with
which such station is affiliated."16 Thus, the Copyright Act ex-
plicitly authorizes exclusive licenses.
The 1976 Act goes beyond prior statutes and case law, how-
owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right,
to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this
title.
See HR REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 123 (1976); see iVi note 19.
12. See Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227-29 (1939) ("(t]he own-
ers of the copyright of a motion picture film acquired the right to-exhibit the picture
and to grant an exclusive and restrictive license to others to exhibit it."); Manners v.
Morosco, 252 U.S. 317, 3252 (1920); Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 270 F.2d
146, 154 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 922 (1960) ("[t]he copyright law confers
upon the owner of the copyright a limited monopoly as regards his copyrighted mate-
rial and as an incident thereof confers upon the owner the right to license others. The
license may be exclusive and, if so, by its very nature it grants the right to exclude
others."). See also Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139,147-51 (3d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982). The Ninth Circuit has previously noted
in dicta that an exclusive license to broadcast television programming is protectable
under copyright law. Cablevision, In v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348, 352, 354 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 US. 989 (1965).
13. Set out at 17 U.S.C. § 106, they include the rights to:
"a) reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords
b) prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work,
c) distribute copies of the work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership,
or by rental, lease, or lending.. ." Id.
14. 17 U.&C. § 106() (1982) (emphasis added).
1L 17 UQ.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added).
16. 17 U.C. § U(e)(3) (1982).
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ever, and recognizes for the first time the divisibility of copy-
right. The Act allows the copyright holder to transfer his
ownership "in whole or in part."17 It also provides that this
transfer of ownership may be in the form of an "exclusive li-
cense ... whether or not it is limited in time or place of
effect."1
The legislative history reflects the Act's purpose to create
unlimited divisibility of copyright.
The principle of unlimited alienability of copyright is stated in
clause (1) of section 201(d). Under that provision the owner-
ship of a copyright, or of any part of it, may be transferred by
any means of conveyance or by operation of law ....
Clause (2) of subsection (d) contains the first explicit statu-
tory recognition of the principle of divisibility of copyright in
our law. This provision, which has long been sought by au-
thors and their representatives, and which has attracted wide
support from other groups, means that any of the exclusive
rights that go to make up a copyright, including those enumer-
ated in section 106 and any subdivision of them, can be trans-
ferred and owned separately. The definition of "transfer of
copyright ownership" in section 101 makes clear that the prin-
ciple of divisibility applies whether or not the transfer is "lim-
ited in time or place of effect," and another definition in the
same section provides that the term "copyright owner," with
respect to any one exclusive right, refers to the owner of that
particular right. The last sentence of section 201(d)(2) adds
that the owner, with respect to the particular exclusive right
he or she owns, is entitled "to all of the protection and reme-
dies accorded to the copyright owner by this title." It is thus
clear, for example, that a local broadcasting station holding an
exclusive license to transmit a particular work within... a
particular geographic area and for a particular period of time,
could sue, in its own name as copyright owner, someone who
infringed that particular exclusive right.19
17. 17 US.C. § 201(d)(1) (1982). When only a part of the ownership is transferred,
the transferee becomes the copyright owner of the rights so transferred and may
bring a suit for infringement in his own name. Id. at § 201(d)(2).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added).
19. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 2d Seass. 123 (1976) (discussing 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(d)). "Unlimited alienability," as referred to in the legislative history, is a prop-
erty law concept. It means the right to transfer or "alienate" the thing in question is
unrestricted. Property law treats restraints on alientaion harshly. The Second Re-
statement on Property states: "A restraint on alienation will be narrowly construed
to keep the restraint as limited as is consistent with the language descibing the re-
straint. This policy of narrowly construing the scope of a restraint is consistent with
[Vol. 7
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The same conclusion emerges from the statutory framework
of the Act.
The statutory framework [of the Copyright Act] is unambigu-
ous; the grant of exclusive rights is only limited by the statu-
tory exceptions. Elementary principles of statutory
construction would indicate that the judiciary should not dis-
turb this carefully constructed statutory scheme in the absence
of compelling reasons to do so. That is, we should not, absent a
clear direction from Congress, disrupt this framework by carv-
ing out exceptions to the broad grant of rights apart from those
in the statute itself.2°
B. Tension With Antitrust Law
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed its "deference to
Congress" on copyright matters, stating "it is Congress [and not
the courts] that has been assigned the task of defining the scope
of the limited monopoly."n The real question, then, is whether
there is "clear direction from Congress" limiting the right of
the copyright holder to define the territory of his license. If
there is, it does not appear in the Sherman Act.2
The language of the Sherman Act is general and inferential.
Courts hold that the Act subjects ordinary exclusive territorial
licenses to the imprecise and unclear direction of the Rule of
Reason.' Of course, ordinary exclusive territorial licenses, un-
like copyright exclusive territorial licenses, are not sanctioned
by statute nor authorized by Constitutional mandate.2 The
Copyright Act's express allowance of exclusive territorial
licenses demands a much clearer check before such licenses
may be deemed restricted. It demands an explicit, unambigu-
ous restriction.25 Where none appears, the copyright holder
the general policy against restraints on alienation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
ERTY § 15., comment e (1977).
20. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am. 659 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, - U.S. -, 104 S. CL 774 (1984) (emphasis added).
2L Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., - U.S. -, 104 S. CL 774,
782 (1984).
22. 15 U.&C. §§ 1-2 (1982).
23. Coninental T. V., 433 U.S. at 57-59; Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 388
(9th Cir. 197S), ot. denied, 440 U.. 936 (1979).
24. U.S. CoNr. art. I, § 8, cL 8.
25. An example of Congress carving out an explicit exception to the copyright
holder's right to define the limits of his license appears in section 1 of the 1976 Act.
The section describes an arrangement under which cable systems are entitled to com-
pulsory licees for the secondary transmission of television or radio broadcasts. 17
U.SC. 111 (1982). See Eastern Microwave, In. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d
No. 3]
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must be deemed to have discretion to set the limits of his
license.
The 1976 Copyright Act and the antitrust laws are not neces-
sarily irreconcilable."s Whenever possible, courts seek to har-
monize apparently conflicting statutes. The Copyright Act
allows exclusive territorial licenses to be set at the copyright
holder's discretion. Antitrust law is not antithetical; it is just
more skeptical. It subjects territorial restrictions to the Rule of
Reason. As stated in Continental TV. , Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc.,2 the Rule of Reason requires a court to weigh the benign
purpose of an agreement against its anticompetitive effects29
Application of the Rule sometimes condemns and sometimes
condones an arrangement. Where one body of law sanctions an
arrangement and another body of law reserves judgment, there
is no direct conflictsc
Nevertheless, if the Copyright Act and the antitrust laws are
irreconcilable, settled rules of statutory construction dictate
that the Copyright Act deserves greater deference. When two
125 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983). Cable systems are authorized to
carry broadcasters' copyrighted works in return for royalty payments made to the
Copyright Royalty Tribunal. 17 U.S.C. § 801 (1982). The drafters of the Act foresaw
that the Federal Communications Commission (F.C.C.) might change its rules and
regulations covering exclusive licenses for syndicated and sports programming. Thus,
they provided for adjustment of royalty payments to the Tribunal to compensate for
possible F.C.C. changes. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2)(C) (1982).
This latter provision suggests that the drafters of the Copyright Act considered any
restriction on the copyright holder's right to grant exclusive territorial licenses (1)
worth making explicit, and (2) worth compensating. Conversely, the provision sug-
gests that no restriction exists unless it is (1) explicitly created by statute and (2)
compensated.
26. Indeed, there is a growing awareness, at least by the Justice Department, that
exclusivity in intellectual property rights - including exclusive licenses - promotes
rather than inhibits competition. See Antitrust Perspective on Intellectual Property
Protection, 30 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 319 (1985).
27. In Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974), appellees, non-Indian employ-
ees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (B.LA.), brought a class action suit claiming that
the employment preference for qualified Indians in the B.I.A. provided by the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 contravened the antidlacrimination provisions of the
Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, and deprived them of property rights
without due process of law. The Court held that Congress did not intend to repeal by
implication the Indian preference.
28. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
29. Id. at 49.
30. Professor Sullivan, discussing patent law, states the argument this war
"Mhe policy emanating from one of the statutes, the patent statute, is explicitly
stated, while that emanating from the other, the antitrust statute, is a general, infer-
ential one. Repeals by inference are not favored, thus the more explicitly stated pol-
icy should prevail." L SULLIvAN, HANDBOOK OF T LAw OF ANTITRuSr 536 (197).
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statutes conflict, the more recent one controls53' The Copyright
Act became law on January 1, 1 97 8 .s1 The Sherman Antitrust
Act became law nearly ninety years earlieras The drafters of
the Copyright Act must be presumed to have been aware of an-
titrust law. The drafters' express recognition of the principle of
unlimited alienability of copyright implies that they expected
and intended the copyright holder to be able to transfer his in-
terest immune to the strictures of antitrust.
m
The Patent Law Analogy
Patents and copyrights are brother monopolies, born of the
same Constitutional mandate. 34 The Supreme Court has ob-
served, on several occasions, that the purpose underlying the
grant of both patents and copyrights is the same: the encour-
agement of individual effort by authors and inventors to ad-
vance the public welfare.as Recently, the Court referred to
"the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law." m
The careful pairing of the Constitutional language--"Science"
with "useful Arts", "Authors" with "Inventors", 'Writings"
31. See International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 757, 761 (D.C.
Cir. 1960) ("[a]ccording to familiar principles of statutory construction, we must seek
to resolve this ambiguity in a manner which gives effect to the latest legislative ex-
pression and still leaves an area of effective operation for the earlier expression"); see
also Davis v. United States, 716 F.2d 418,428 (7th Cir. 1983) (spirit of later statute may
be allowed to limit the scope of an earlier one, despite the hoary canon of statutory
construction that repeal by implication is disfavored).
32. 17 US.C. Transitional and Supplementary Provisions § 102 (1982).
3. The Sherman Antitrust Act became law on July 2, 1890.15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)
(parenthetical information following text of statute).
34. U.S. CoNST., art. I, § 8, dl. 8. Antitrust law is a poor cousin to these brother
monopolies. The 'Science and useful Arts" clause is unmistakable: it contemplates
the grant of monopolies. By comparison, the commerce clause, which authorizes anti-
trust law, is a rudderless mandate. It empowers Congress to regulate commerce, but
it does not say how. It prefers no particular economic philosophy. There is no ques-
tion that antitrust law is constitutional. But, for that matter, a Congressional scheme
that permitted combinations in restraint of trade also would be constitutional.
The Constitution envisions copyright and patent monopolies. It merely allows a
system of antitrust regulation. Thus, the Ninth Circuit may have been too generous
to antitrust law when it noted that the sections of the Patent Act permitting geo-
graphically limited exclusive licenses rest on the provisions of the Constitution in
Art. I, §8, Clause 8. Patent laws therefore are equally as valid as antitrust laws."
Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mg. Co. 211 F.2d 121, 128 (9th Cir. 1954).
35. Zamebni v. Scripps-Howard BroadasU g Co., 433 U.S 562,576(1977) (quoting
Maser v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555
(9IM).
S6. Sony v. Universal City Studios, Inc., - U.S - 104 S. Ct. 74, 787 (1984).
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with "Discoveries"- manifests the drafters' intent to accord
patents and copyrights equal dignity.Y
The Patent Acts' permits the patentee to "convey an exclu-
sive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the
whole or any specified part of the United States." The Copy-
right Act now permits the copyright holder the same leeway in
issuing an exclusive license "whether or not it is limited in...
place of effect."' 0
Patent law, therefore, provides instruction on the validity of
territorial copyright licenses. The instruction is plain. Case
law upholds the patentee's right to grant geographically limited
exclusive licenses.4 So long as only a territorial license is in-
volved, the patentee's right is unquestioned. "Exclusive territo-
rial licenses granted under patents are old in the law. Unless
they run afoul of the antitrust laws for other reasons... they
are legal.'
42
Antitrust issues arise only when the patentee seeks to graft
some additional economic advantage onto the license-for ex-
37. The pairing may strike the modern reader as mistaken. "Authors" and "Writ-
ings" appear to be erroneously linked to "Science." Two hundred years ago, however,
readers in the newly free colonies understood "science" as a concept contradistin-
guished from "art." "The distinction as commonly apprehended [was] that a science
is concerned with theoretical truth, and an art with methods of effecting certain re-
suIts." II COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2668 (1971). These
readers paired patents with '"seful Arts" or practical, result-oriented innovations.
Science was linked to writings because it had broader, less practical connotations. See
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 172 U.S.P.Q. 670,683 (Comm'r Ct. Cl. 1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), qffd by an equally divided Court,
420 U.S. 376 (1975).
38. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376 (1982).
39. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982) (emphasis added).
40. 17 U.S.C. §101 (1982) (defining "transfer of copyright ownership.")
41. See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476,489 (1926) (approving
right to grant local licenses for sale of electric lamps); United States v. Studiengesell-
schaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122,1136-37 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (approving exclusive terri-
torial licenses for production process); Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211
F.2d 121,128-29 (9th Cir. 1954) (approving exclusive territorial licenses for wire prod-
ucts and processes); Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Eisele & Co., 86 F.2d 267, 269 (6th Cir.
1936), cert denied, 300 U.S. 667 (1937) (approving exclusive territorial licenses for
steel tubing); American Indus. Fastener Corp. v. Flushing Enter., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 32,
37 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (approving exclusive territorial licenses for first sales of washers);
United States v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp. 118, 127 (N.D. M. 1956) (ap-
proving exclusive territorial licenses for manufacture of cabinets); Security Materials
Co. v. Mixermobile Co., 72 F. Supp. 450, 455-56 (S.D. Cal. 1947) (approving exclusive
territorial licenses for sale of mobile mixers). Q. 14 H. EINHORN, BUSINES ORGANM-
ZATIONs PATENT IjCENSING TRANSACTIONS §2.01(2] (1985); 8 A. DELLEF, DELLER'S
WALKER ON PATENTS § 649 (2d ed. 1973 & Supp. 1984).
42. Brownell v. Ketcham Wire, 211 F.2d at 129.
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ample when the patentee uses the territorial license to fix
prices," to tie in the patented article to unpatented ones," to
tie out or exclude competing articles," or to cross-license."
Plain, unvarnished territorial licenses do not raise antitrust
concerns because they do not expand the scope of the monop-
oly-they merely subdivide it.47 The patentee has complete dis-
cretion to define the boundaries as he sees fit. Thus, Professor
Areeda writes: 'The owner of the patent on incandescent
lamps can license 50 manufacturers, restricting each to the pro-
duction and sale of the lamps in one state."4 An oft-cited au-
thority holds:
In granting a license the patentee may limit the licensee's right
to sell. He may grant a license to make and use the patented
articles, but withhold the right to sell them He may license
one to make, and another to vend, and still another to use, and
he may confine each to a specified part of the United States.
Manifestly his monopoly has no extraterritorial validity, but
within the jurisdiction of the United States he has the exclu-
sive authority to exclude or control the making of the patented
articles, or the using and vending of them within the United
States wheresoever they are made."
Similarly, courts have held that patentees have the discretion
to grant or refuse to grant licenses. "Whether the refusal to
license is based on a commendable or odious reason is immate-
rial.''P5 An exclusive territorial license is nothing more than
4& McGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & bfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 407 (1947); United
States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942); American Equip. Co. v. Tuthill
Bldg. Material Co, 69 F.2d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 1934).
44. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666-67 (1944); Morton
Salt Co. v. G.8 Suppiger Co., 314 U.. 488,493 (1942); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135-38 (1969).
45. McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 166 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 813 (1948); National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255, 256
(3d Cir. 1943).
46. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 310 (1948).
47. United States v. Studlengesellchaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1135-36
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform of N. An., Inc., 605 F. Supp.
112, 111 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). See L. SULuVAN, aupra note 30, at 534.
48. P. AREEDA, ANTTRUST ANALYSIS 336 (1967).
49. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Eisele & Co., 86 F.2d 267, 269 (6th Cir. 1936), cert.
denied, 300 U.. 667 (1937) (emphasis added).
50. Radio Corp. of Am. v. Hygrade Sylvania Corp., 10 F. Supp. 879, 883 (D.NJ.
1934). See also Hercules Powder Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 66 F. Supp. 899,906 (D. DeL
1946); Radio Corp. of Am. v. Duovac Radio Tube Corp., 6 F. Supp. 275, 277 (E.D.N.Y.
1931). But see United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1945),




the geographic expression of a patentee's decision to grant or to
deny a license. The boundaries of the license demark his con-
tinuing choice: here he grants, here he refuses. Accordingly,
the patentee's unfettered discretion in granting or refusing
licenses also applies to defining the geographical borders of
licenses. By analogy, the same discretion applies to defining
the geographical borders of copyright licenses. If the licenses
contain mere territorial limitations, the reasons for such limita-
tions are immaterial.
Although born of the same Constitutional mandate as pat-
ents, copyrights did not enjoy the same statutory ambit for ter-
ritorial licenses until January 1, 1978.51 Prior statutory
omission of this attribute of copyright law explains, in large
part, the result in United States v. Chicago Tribune-New York
News Syndicate, Inc.,2 the only reported decision directly con-
tradicting this article's thesis.
IV
The Chicago Tribune Case
Chicago Tribune involved a "feature syndicate," an organiza-
tion that acquires copyright to such features as comic strips,
crossword puzzles, and columns, and then licenses newspapers
to publish them. As part of its license agreements with news-
papers, the feature syndicate specified exclusive territories
within which it agreed not to furnish the features to any other
newspaper." The issue before the court was whether copyright
law immunized the license agreements from antitrust chal-
lenge "no matter how 'arbitrary' or how 'unreasonably broad'
the territory may be .... ." The court concluded it did not.,
The court held that if the exclusive territories proved greater
than necessary to protect the contracting newspapers' use of
the purchased features, they would constitute Sherman Act
violations.M
Chicago Tribune was decided eight years before the current
Copyright Act took effect. The introduction to its copyright
51. The effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act.
52. 309 F. Supp. 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
53. Id. at 1302.
54. Id.




law analysis indicates why the decision is of dubious applicabil-
ity today.
It is assumed for purposes of this decision that as a matter of
copyright law a license may be made exclusive within a speci-
fied territory. This proposition, however, is by no means so
firmly established as movant contends. In the patent law,
there is a specific provision for conveyance of an exclusive
right "to the whole or any specified part of the United States."
There is no similar provision in the Copyright Act.57
Today, of course, there is.
The court relied heavily, and mistakenly, on Interstate Cir-
cuit Inc. v. United States.5S Interstate involved an arrange-
ment between eight distributors of motion pictures and two
exhibitors. The two exhibitors enjoyed a monopoly in parts of
Texas and New Mexico. The exhibitors used their monopoly
power to impose two restrictions on the distributors, restric-
tions that the Supreme Court held subject to antitrust chal-
lenge even though the products in question-motion pictures-
were copyrighted. Chicago Tribune stated that "[e]ach distrib-
utor agreed to the two restrictions which, while not geographi-
cal, seem to have been in principle the same as the geographical
restriction found here."'' The decision proceeds to furnish
lengthy quotations from the majority and dissenting opinions
in Interstate."0 Inexplicably, the decision never describes these
two restrictions, and never shows how they resembled the geo-
graphical restriction at issue.
The two restrictions in Interstate compelled the distributors
to: (1) impose minimum admission prices on second-run mo-
tion picture theatres, and (2) prohibit certain theatres from ex-
hibiting "double features" (two feature pictures in
conjunction).s The first restriction constituted price fixing.2
The second restriction "tied out" other products." It is not sur-
prising that the Supreme Court found the restrictions subject
to antitrust challenge. The patent monopoly gives no sanction
to similar practices in patent license agreements. Similarly,
57. Id. at 1302-03 (citation omitted).
5. 306 US. 208 (1939).
59. 309 F. Supp. at 1303 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 130.
61. 306 U.& at 216-17.
62. See E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw §§ 102.-10.18 (1980).




there is no reason why copyright law should sanction them in
copyright license agreements. Chicago Tribune's silent equa-
tion of these practices with plain geographical restrictions is
unjustifiable. The latter add nothing to the copyright monop-
oly. They impose no greater restraint on commerce than the
statutory monopoly itself."
Oiicago Tribune also relied on Interstate as support for an
argument rendered obsolete by the new Copyright Act. Both
cases emphasized that the licenses in question were "imposed"
by the licensees, not by the copyright owner.6 Under then-ex-
isting law, the distinction had significance. Only the licensor
was a copyright owner. There was no basis for affording the
protection of copyright law to the licensee, because he was not a
copyright owner. Under the 1976 Copyright Act, an exclusive
licensee is a copyright owner. The new Act recognizes, for the
first time, that copyright is a bundle of rights and an exclusive
transferee of any of them becomes the copyright owner of that
right." The transferor loses an equal measure of ownership. 7
The situation described in Interstate and Ciicago Tribune-
where nonowning exclusive licensees impose their will on own-
ing licensors-no longer exists."
Moreover, the argument betrays an ignorance of market real-
ities and industry customs. In the marketplace of copyright,
value nearly always depends on exclusivity. Therefore, "news-
papers, broadcasters, and film distributors almost always re-
quire exclusive use. In an industry where exclusivity grants
are the custom, it is less significant that the purchaser, rather
than the supplier, suggested the exclusivity provisions." 9
Chicago Tribune stated one other questionable basis for sub-
jecting the licenses to antitrust review:
The government may be able to show at trial that there are no
products available in the market which are "equivalent" to the
features of Tribune. This seems to be the fair intendment of
64. See supra text accompanying notes 40-51.
65. Interstate, 306 U.S. at 228-29; Chicago Tribune, 309 F. Supp. at 1307.
66. See supra notes 17-20.
67. 17 U.S.C. §201(d)(1), (2) (1982).
68. 17 U.S.C. §201(e) concerns involuntary transfers. It holds that such transfers
are ineffective. Thus, the Act sets up a simple choice. Either the transfer is volun-
tary, and represents an agreement between part owners, or it is involuntary, and con-
sequently void.
69. Woodbury Daily Times Co. v. Los Angeles Times-Wash. Post News Serv., 616
F. Supp. 502 (D.NJ. 1985).
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the averments of the complaint and the additional agreed fact
that the features are copyrighted gives support to this view.7°
"Equivalents" is an antitrust law term of art. It refers to
products that are sufficiently interchangeable to be deemed
competitive.7 The concept has use in an antitrust context; for
example, the bicycle market. But its usefulness is severely
limited-if not nonexistent-in the copyright context. There is
only one Doonesbury comic strip. There is only one Star Wars
movie. The fact that there may be other political satire comic
strips or science fiction movies does not mean that there are
Doonesbury "equivalents" or Star Wars "equivalents." The
reason these copyrighted features are successful is that their
authors' creativity has rendered them unique. There may be
imitators, but there is no definable market comprising Doones-
bury strips or Star Wars movies. If there were, copyright in-
fringement would be the likely explanation.
Copyright is a monopoly. By imposing this "equivalents"
test, Chicago Tribune stood copyright law on its head. It held
that the copyright holder is likely to enjoy less, not more, im-
munity from antitrust law than the producer of some
noncopyrighted good, for the latter's goods will probably have
marketplace "equivalents." Copyright holders' goods will not.
Thus, Chicago Tribune leads to the bizarre conclusion that
those upon whom Congress has bestowed a statutory monopoly
enjoy less protection from the antimonopoly laws.
The continuing vitality of Chicago Tribune is questionable in
light of the final decision in Ralph C. Wilson Industries, Inc. v.
Chronicle Broadcasting Co.,72 a case involving exclusive televi-
sion program licenses. Initially, the court followed Chicago
Tribune and denied the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment.7 Subsequently, however, the court reconsidered its rul-
ing and invited further briefing by the parties, specifically on
the impact of the 1976 Copyright Act.74 After the further brief-
ing and argument, the court granted defendants' motion for
70. 309 F. Supp. at 1307.
71. See United States v. Arnold Schwlnn & Co., 388 U.S. 365,376 (1967), ovemaled
on other grounds, Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
72. Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,012 (N.D. CaL 1982).
7. Id.
74. Reporter's Transcript of Pretrial Hearing at 65, Ralph E. Wilson Indus. v.
Chronicle Broadcasting Co., No. C 804614 SC (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 1984).
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summary judgment on the entire action."'
The court based its ruling on conventional antitrust
grounds.76 The court added a footnote, however, regarding
copyright. "Given the court's disposition of this case, it need
not address defendants' argument that the new Copyright Act
exempts these exclusive licenses from coverage under the anti-
trust laws."' 7 This footnote, and the court's earlier invitation to
the parties to brief the copyright issue, suggest that the slate
has been wiped clean.
Woodbury Daily Times Co., Inc. v. Los Angeles Times- Wash-
ington Post News Seoice" also approached, but declined to ad-
dress, the issue. The case involved exclusive subscriptions to
news services providing copyrighted stories. The court granted
defendant summary judgment based on the Rule of Reason. It
observed, preliminarily: "A monopolistic grant to use copy-
righted materials that the Sherman Act forbids but the Copy-
right Act allows may one day squarely confront the courts and
force judicial consideration of this conflict.""9
When it does, the courts will face the issue of the per se legal-
ity of exclusive territorial licenses under the 1976 Copyright
Act unrestricted by stare decisis.
V
The Concept of Copyright
The copyright holder has complete discretion to set the geo-
graphical boundaries of his license because, conceptually, copy-
right commands that result. Copyright is a monopoly. It is one
of a number of islands of monopoly raised above sea level. An-
titrust law rules the waves, but it holds no sway on the many
sanctioned islands: copyright, patent, labor unions,8° farmer co-
operatives,8 ' and fishery cooperatives,82 to name a few. What
happens on the islands is of no concern to antitrust law. Anti-
trust considerations are implicated only when the islanders,
75. Ralph E. Wilson Indus. v. American Broadcasting Co., 598 F. Supp. 694 (Nf.
Cal. 1984).
76. Id at 710.
77. Id at 710 n.16.
78. 616 F. Supp. 502 (D.NJ. 1985).
79. Id. at 505.
80. 15 US.C. § 17 (1982); 29 US.C. § 52 (1982).
81. 15 US.C. § 17 (1982); 7 US.C. §§ 291-92 (1982).
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 521, 522 (1982).
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like the Dutch, build dikes and levees and seek to extend their
land beyond the water's edge. The issue of setting geographic
limits to copyright licenses concerns dividing the island. It does
not concern extending the island's land mass.
This conceptual analysis finds acceptance in discussions of
the patent monopoly. Patent authorities do not shirk at ap-
proving monopoly. "The very object of these laws is monopoly
.... ,"8 Instead, they inquire whether the practice enlarges
the island, i.e., whether it expands the monopoly. The same
analysis should find acceptance in copyright.
The right to have a monopoly necessarily embraces the
"lesser right" to subdivide it by time or territory."' As long as
the practice entails subdivision, it should be outside the pur-
view of antitrust law.85
Professor Kaplow writes that the "lesser right" argument
"has been rejected in many contexts, typically because the
lesser can indeed be more of an evil than the greater or be-
cause regulation of the lesser restriction can lead to substantial
improvement in light of the unwillingness of the regulated en-
tity to .resort to the greater restriction.' 'sa The only "contexts"
Professor Kaplow furnishes as illustrations, however, are em-
ployment contracts and consumer sales. He points out that
while government can regulate hiring and selling, private firms
retain the greater right of going out of bdness.87
It is unclear what this has to do with patent law or copyright
law. No statutory monopoly pertains to hiring or selling.
Moreover, the two rationales he offers are plainly inappropri-
ate here. First, subdividing the copyright monopoly geographi-
cally cannot be "a greater evil" than maintaining the monopoly
as a whole. The "evil" antitrust law combats is restraint on
83. Becton, Dicknson & Co. v. Eisele & Co., 86 F.2d 267, 270 (6th Cir. 1936), cart
denied, 300 U.S. 667 (1937) (quoting E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., 186
US. 70, 91 (1902)).
84. American Equip. Co. v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., 69 F.2d 406, 408 (7th Cir.
1934). This is sometimes referred to as "the inherency doctrine." See Miller In-
situform, Inc. v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc. 605 F. Supp. 1125, 1131 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
85. 69 F.2d at 408; Bela Seating Co. v. Poloron Prods., 297 F. Supp. 489, 509-10
(N.D. M1. 1968), qOt'd, 438 F.2d 733 (7th COr.), cert denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971); cf. Me.
tromedlia Brocas Corp. v. MGM/UA Entertainment Co., 611 F. Supp. 415 (C.D.
CaL 1985), holding that "carving up" the copyright to the syndicated television pro-
gram "Fame" into first run and rerun rights would not promote competition.
86. Kaplow, The PatnttAn at Intesecto . A Reappraisal, 97 HAMv. L Rsv.
87 IdM (1914).97. Id. at 1846 n.95.
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competition. A subdivided monopoly cannot restrain competi-
tion more than a unitary monopoly. If anything, it restrains
competition less because it creates more market sources who
are ready to compete when the term of exclusivity expires.
There may even be ways in which exclusive licensees in differ-
ent territories compete against each other- for example, the
exclusive movie theatre in City A may lower its price to attract
patrons from City B away from their exclusive theatre.88
Kaplow's second rationale-that regulating the lesser practice
may discourage the entity from practicing the greater-is sim-
ply inapplicable to copyright. The copyright law openly per-
mits the holder to practice the greater restraint, i.e., to have a
territorial monopoly in which to sell or not sell whenever and
wherever it chooses.
Subdivision by geographic licenses cannot suppress free com-
petition to any greater extent than the monopoly itself sup-
presses it.
If the patentee invents a clearly superior technology, whether
a product or process, and divides the country into exclusive ter-
ritories... [t]here would be a de facto monopoly irrespective
of whether the territories were divided. In such a case, as Pro-
fessor Sullivan argues, "[v]irtue is not attacked, let alone un-
done .... Competition is restricted to no greater degree by
the assignment than is inherent in the patent grant itself."8 9
Arbitrary territorial subdivision of a copyright monopoly may
or may not be good, but it cannot be any more anticompetitive
than the monopoly itself.
This analysis of islands and oceans may seem unfair. Even
though arbitrary subdivision of a copyright monopoly does not
expand the monopoly, it may work an anticompetitive effect on
the party whose request for a license is arbitrarily refused.
From his vantage point, the result is unfair. But antitrust law
provides that his vantage point is immaterial. Antitrust law is
concerned "with the protection of competition, not competi-
tors." 9° As long as the ocean of competition is undiminished, it
does not matter how the island is subdivided.
Nothing can be more anticompetitive than a monopoly con-
88. See L. SuurvAN, supra note 30, at 534.
89. United States v. Studlengesellschnft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1136 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (quoting L. SUIrvAN, supra note 30, at 534.)




trolled by a single party. Yet, the law sanctions it. Subdividing
that monopoly-whether for reasons good, bad, philanthropic,
or odious-merely renders the monopoly less monolithic. It
should not be subject to the antitrust laws. When a monopoly




The 1976 Copyright Act, analogous patent law, and the con-
cept of copyright provide a foundation for the per se legality of
exclusive territorial licenses. The only decision contradicting
this position, Chicago Tribune, was decided before the enact-
ment of the 1976 Act. It deserves no deference.
The new Copyright Act, by providing the first explicit statu-
tory recognition of the principle of divisibility of copyright, cre-
ates a new universe of copyright holders. The original creator
now has company under the shelter of the Act. Others pro-
tected by the Act include networks, television stations, televi-
sion program syndicators, newspapers, concert promoters, and
the countless other businessmen who deal in the marketing of
creative expressions.
Per se rules exist under antitrust law to provide certainty.
'Without the per se rules, businessmen would be left with little
to aid them in predicting in any particular case what courts will
find to be legal and illegal under the Sherman Act.'*] There is
no reason why the guidance of per se rules should be only nega-
tive. Some cases, however, suggest there is no such thing as per
se legality, only per se illegality.' Yet businessmen, particu-
larly those whose business is the marketing of copyrightable
expressions, need positive, as well as prohibitory, guidelines.
They also need more than a choice between a flat prohibition
and the dubious blessing of the Rule of Reason. Observers
have realized since the infancy of antitrust law that the Rule of
Reason is a fogbound beacon. Seventy years ago, Walter Lipp-
mann wrote:
The men who rule this country today were all alive, and pre-
sumably sane, when the Sherman Act was passed. They all say
91. United States v. Topco Accs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972).
92. S e.g., Sausalito Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue Shield of CaL, TRADE CAs. (CCH) I
6388 (ND. Cal. 1M1), "ffd, 677 F.2d 47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982).
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in public that it is a great piece of legislation-an "exquisite
instrument" someone called it the other day. The highest paid
legal intelligence has concentrated on the Act. The Supreme
Court has interpreted it many times, ending with the enor-
mous assumption that reason had something to do with the
law. The Supreme Court was denounced for this: the reform-
ers said that if there was any reason in the law, the devil him-
self had got hold of i. As I write, Congress is engaged in trying
to define what it thinks it means by the Act....
There is another reason, beside clarity, for promoting the
doctrine of per se legality. A philosophical tension exists be-
tween antitrust and copyright law. Antitrust law aims to sup-
press dominance in the marketplace. Copyright law aims to
protect products of the mind. Can a book really "dominate" its
marketplace the way an oil company or an automobile manu-
facturer might? And even if a book can, is this the kind of
"dominance" a free society should preclude? The notion of un-
lawful market power may be completely out of place in the
marketplace of creative expressions." Assuming it has its
place, the law should jealously monitor the intrusion of anti-
trust law into the realm of copyright, and, where appropriate,
establish zones of per se legality.
93. Lppmann, Dr(ft and Maak*, in ROOSEVELT, WILSON, AND THE TRUTS I101
(E. Rozwenc ed. 1950).
94. After all, what does the copyright monopoly protect? Exclusive syndication
rights to George F. Will columns do not preclude anyone else from espousing conser-
vatism. Exclusive syndication rights to Anthony Lewis do not preclude anyone else
from espousing liberalism. These authors and their licensees have no market power
whatsoever in the marketplace of Ideas. Anyone else is free to compete - whether
competition takes the form of expressing agreement or criticism. Ultimately, Mr.
Will and his licensees have market power In one extremely narrow market: Will's
words. What is wrong with monopoly over words, exercised by the speaker or his
licensees, in a marketplace crammed with plenty of other noisy monopolists?
[Vol. 7
